Competition Policy: An Empirical and Economic Approach

Competition Policy aims to explain competition policy through economic analysis of antitrust cases, focusing on Europe and comparing with the U.S. It is a truism of competition that, paradoxically, those responsible for yesterday’s innovations and productivity become obstacles to future growth. At a time of increasing public concern regarding high industrial concentration, especially in the digital sector, the question of regulating competition is returning to the forefront. This utterly original book, which thoroughly explains competition policy using economic analyses, illuminates the complex but crucial back and forth between theory and practice.

Covering both cartels, abuse of dominant position, and merger control, the author examines topical issues such as private and public enforcement, thus illustrating how economic principles are applied in practice. Issues and topics include the following:

• the economic approach of antitrust sanctions;
• the role of criminal sanctions and private actions;
• the factors favoring cartel formation and stability;
• the role of leniency policies;
• the vertical restraints in the age of e-commerce;
• the economic assessment of R&D and licensing agreements;
• the detection and sanction of predatory pricing;
• the exploitative and exclusionary abuses; and
• the impact of horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate mergers on competition.

With many illustrative examples, from case law, there is also a chapter presenting an overview of competition policies around the world and the legal and institutional frameworks within which they operate.

One of its kind, this book will be of value to lawyers and attorneys to better understand the objectives and instruments of competition policy. It can thus enable corporate counsel, academics, and policymakers to apply or formulate competition law with increased precision in their day-to-day work. This book offers students an integrated vision of competition policy covering all major fields.