Corporate Bankruptcy Law in China: Principles, Limitations and Options for Reform

1. Introduction
1.1 Theoretical Framework: Economic Analysis of Law
1.2 Why Bankruptcy Law Matters
1.3 Methodology
1.4 Structure of the Book
PART I: BACKGROUND
2. China's Socio-economic, Political and Legal Environment
2.1 Economic and Political transformation of China
2.2 Power and the Party-state
2.3 Laws and Rules in China
2.4 Courts, the Party-state and Limited Law Enforcement in China
2.5 Corporate Ownership and Control in China
3. Debt finance and enforcement in China
3.1 Debt Finance in China
3.2 Companies' Access to Credit in China
3.3 Debt Enforcement Mechanisms in China
3.4 General Challenges to Debt Enforcement in China
PART II: The EBL & ITS PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS
4. Bankruptcy Law in China
4.1 History of Bankruptcy Law in China
4.2 Black-letter Overview of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006
4.3 Supreme People's Court's Interpretations and Judicial Cases
4.4 Personal Bankruptcy Law
5. Limited Use of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006 and Its Causes
5.1 Limited Use of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006
5.2 Reasons for the Limited Use of the EBL – the Four 'Constraints'
6. The First Constraint – Creditors and Debtors Feel Insufficiently Protected under the EBL
6.1 Implications of Courts' Duties to Protect Employees
6.2 Heightened Threat Of Scrutiny And Liability Under the EBL
6.3 Insolvency As De Facto Entry Requirement For Reorganisation
7. The Second Constraint – Reduced Recoveries Under the EBL
7.1 General Flaws in Debt Enforcement That Negatively Affect Recoveries Under the EBL
7.2 Shortcomings That Specifically Affect EBL Enforcement
7.3 The EBL May Not Be a Viable Option Due to Nature of Certain Debt Contracts
8. The Third Constraint – Limitations and Biases of EBL Enforcers
8.1 Courts' and Lawyers' Internal Limitations
8.2 Administrators' Passivity
8.3 The Party-State's Influence over Court Enforcement of the EBL
9. The Fourth Constraint – Non-EBL Debt Enforcement Mechanisms
9.1 Private Alternatives and Their Perceived Advantages
9.2 Politically-Driven Alternatives and Their Perceived Advantages
PART III: DESIRABILITY & OPTIONS FOR REFORM
10. Desirability of Reforming Bankruptcy Law in China
10.1 Is a Greater Use of Bankruptcy Law in China Desirable?
10.2 Benefits of Greater Use of (Reformed) EBL
10.3 Nature of Further Reform
11. Options for Reform
11.1 Reforms Aimed at Improving EBL Provisions
11.2 Reforms Aimed at Improving EBL Enforcement Practices and Surrounding Rules
11.3 Reforms Aimed at EBL Enforcers
12. Local Reform Initiatives 2015-2020
12.1 What Set Off Recent Bankruptcy Law Reform
12.2 Summary of Key Reforms 2015-2020
12.3 Reform I: Encourage Greater Use of the EBL – Resolving Zombie Companies
12.4 Reform II: Specialised Courts Bankruptcy and Administrator Associations
12.5 Reform III: EBL Platform
12.6 Reform IV: Judicial and Political Guidance
12.7 Reform V: Local Conferences and Experience-Sharing Events
12.8 Reform VI: Simplified EBL Procedure
12.9 Reform VII: Personal Bankruptcy
12.10 Reform VIII: Bankruptcy Assistance Fund
12.11 Reform IX: Judges' Evaluation System for Resolving EBL Cases
12.12 Reform X: Cooperation with Local Party-State
12.13 The Future
PART IV: FOREIGN STAKEHOLDERS & the EBL
13. The Role of Foreign Parties in Corporate Bankruptcy Cases in China
13.1 Foreign Influence in the Making of the EBL
13.2 Rules and Guidance that Govern Cross-border Bankruptcies in China
13.3 Foreign Stakeholders in Corporate Bankruptcy Cases in China
CONCLUSION
Bibliography