Economic Models Of Law

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Economic Models Of Law

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The economic approach to law relies on the use of economic models, mostly mathematical, for understanding the nature and function of law. The articles in this new collection reflect state-of-the-art modeling techniques and explore how to use these to both formulate important questions and resolve particular legal issues. Following an original introduction by the editors, the volume spans the many sub-areas of law and economics (with papers in torts, contracts, property, crime, and legal procedure) and includes a wide range of papers, incorporating classics and some less well-known papers.

Economic Models of Law will be an invaluable resource for active scholars as well as an inspiration for the next generation of modelers.

Acknowledgements

Introduction Thomas J. Miceli and Matthew J. Baker

PART I GENERAL

1. Robert Cooter (1985), ‘Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution’
2. Donald Wittman (1981), ‘Optimal Pricing of Sequential Inputs: Last Clear Chance, Mitigation of Damages, and Related Doctrines in the Law’

PART II TORTS
3. A. Mitchell Polinsky and William P. Rogerson (1983), ‘Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and Market Power’
4. Steven Shavell (1984), ‘A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation’
5. Keith N. Hylton (1990), ‘The Influence of Litigation Costs on Deterrence Under Strict Liability and Under Negligence’
6. Kathryn E. Spier (2011), ‘Product Safety, Buybacks, and the Post-Sale Duty to Warn’

PART III CONTRACTS
7. Russell Cooper and Thomas W. Ross (1985), ‘Product Warranties and Double Moral Hazard’
8. Steven Shavell (1994), ‘Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale’
9. Yeon-Koo Che and Tai-Yeong Chung (1999), ‘Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments’

PART IV PROPERTY
10. Dean Lueck (1995), ‘The Rule of First Possession and the Design of the Law’
11. Mathew J. Baker (2003), ‘An Equilibrium Conflict Model of Land Tenure in Hunter-Gatherer Societies’
12. Matthew Baker and Thomas J. Miceli (2005), ‘Land Inheritance Rules: Theory and Cross-Cultural Analysis’
13. Lawrence Blume, Daniel L. Rubinfeld and Perry Shapiro (1984), ‘The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation Be Paid?’
14. Thomas J. Miceli and Kathleen Segerson (1994), ‘Regulatory Takings: When Should Compensation Be Paid?’
15. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1989), ‘An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law’
16. Paul Klemperer (1990), ‘How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?’

PART V CRIME
17. Gary Becker (1968), ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’
18. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell (2000), ‘The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law’
19. William J. Furlong (1987), ‘A General Equilibrium Model of Crime Commission and Prevention’

PART VI LEGAL PROCESS
20. Jennifer F. Reinganum (1988), ‘Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion’
21. Barry Nalebluff (1987), ‘Credible Pretrial Negotiation’
22. Avery Katz (1990), ‘The Effect of Frivolous Litigation on the Settlement of Legal Disputes’

Edited by Thomas J. Miceli, Professor of Economics, University of Connecticut, US and Matthew J. Baker, Associate Professor of Economics, Hunter College, City University of New York, US