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Economics of Financial Law

Economics of Financial Law

Author: Geoffrey P. Miller
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 9781783471829
Published In: February 2016
Format: Hardback (2 volumes) , 1584 pages
Jurisdiction: International ? Disclaimer:
Countri(es) stated herein are used as reference only

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Contents

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Covering the most important areas of the subject, such as financial crises, the nature of the banking firm and issues in bank regulation, Economics of Financial Law is a comprehensive collection of the papers that have shaped the field of financial law.

The original introduction by editor Professor Geoffrey Miller provides a thorough and authoritative examination of the material and, together with the articles included, will prove to be an invaluable resource for academics and practitioners alike.

Volume I

Introduction Geoffrey P. Miller

PART I THE NATURE OF THE BANKING FIRM

1. George J. Benston (2004), ‘What’s Special About Banks?’, Financial Review, 39 (1), February, 13–33

2. Martin Hellwig (1998), ‘Banks, Markets, and the Allocation of Risks in an Economy’, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 154 (1), March, 328–45

3. Anil K. Kashyap, Raghuram Rajan and Jeremy C. Stein (2002), ‘Banks as Liquidity Providers: An Explanation for the Coexistence of Lending and Deposit-Taking’, Journal of Finance, 57 (1), February, 33–73

4. Douglas W. Diamond and Raghuram G. Rajan (2001), ‘Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking’, Journal of Political Economy, 109 (2), April, 287–327

PART II SHADOW BANKS

5. Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick (2010), ‘Regulating the Shadow Banking System’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 41 (2), Fall, 261–312

6. Morgan Ricks (2012), ‘A Regulatory Design for Monetary Stability’, Vanderbilt Law Review, 65 (5), October, 1289–360

PART III LIQUIDITY

7. Charles W. Calomiris and Charles M. Kahn (1991), ‘The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements’, American Economic Review, 81 (3), June, 497–513

8. Gary Gorton and George Pennacchi (1990), ‘Financial Intermediaries and Liquidity Creation’, Journal of Finance, 45 (1), March, 49–71

PART IV LENDING

9. Gary Gorton and James Kahn (2000), ‘The Design of Bank Loan Contracts’, Review of Financial Studies, 13 (2), April, 331–64

10. Clifford W. Smith, Jr. and Jerold B. Warner (1979), ‘On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants’, Journal of Financial Economics, 7 (2), June, 117–61

11. Douglas W. Diamond (1984), ‘Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring’, Review of Economic Studies, 51 (3), July, 393–414

12. Franklin Allen and Anthony M. Santomero (1997), ‘The Theory of Financial Intermediation’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 21 (11–12), December, 1461–85

PART V CAPITAL

13. Douglas W. Diamond and Raghuram G. Rajan (2000), ‘A Theory of Bank Capital’, Journal of Finance, 55 (6), December, 2431–65

14. Berry K. Wilson and Edward J. Kane (1996), ‘The Demise of Double Liability as an Optimal Contract for Large-Bank Stockholders’, NBER Working Paper No.

5848, December, i, 2–24, notes

15. Benjamin C. Esty (1998), ‘The Impact of Contingent Liability on Commercial Bank Risk Taking’, Journal of Financial Economics, 47 (2), February, 189–218

16. John C. Coffee, Jr. (2011), ‘Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight’, Columbia Law Review, 111 (4), May, 795–847

17. Patrick Bolton and Frédéric Samama (2012), ‘Capital Access Bonds: Contingent Capital with an Option to Convert’, Economic Policy, 27 (70), April, 277–317

18. Charles W. Calomiris and Richard J. Herring (2013), ‘How to Design a Contingent Convertible Debt Requirement That Helps Solve Our Too-Big-to-Fail Problem’, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 25 (2), Spring, 39–62

PART VI BANK RUNS AND SYSTEMIC RISK

19. Douglas W. Diamond and Philip H. Dybvig (1983), ‘Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity’, Journal of Political Economy, 91 (3), June, 401–19

20. Charles W. Calomiris (1990), ‘Is Deposit Insurance Necessary? A Historical Perspective’, Journal of Economic History, 50 (2), June, 283–95

Index

Volume II

Acknowledgements

An introduction to both volumes by the editor appears in Volume I

PART I FINANCIAL CRISES

1. Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933), ‘First Fireside Chat, Delivered on 12th March 1933’, [accessed at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14540, 09.07.2015], re-set

2. Viral V. Acharya (2009), ‘A Theory of Systemic Risk and Design of Prudential Bank Regulation’, Journal of Financial Stability, 5 (3), September, 224–55

3. Steven L. Schwarcz (2008), ‘Systemic Risk’, Georgetown Law Journal, 97 (1), 193–249

4. Ben S. Bernanke (1983), ‘Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in Propagation of the Great Depression’, American Economic Review, 73 (3), June, 257–76

5. Erik F. Gerding (2009), ‘Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of Financial Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis’, Washington Law Review, 84 (2), 127–98

6. Geoffrey P. Miller and Gerald Rosenfeld (2010), ‘Intellectual Hazard: How Conceptual Biases in Complex Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of 2008’, Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, 33 (2), March, 807–40

7. Martin F. Hellwig (2009), ‘Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: An Analysis of the Subprime-Mortgage Financial Crisis’, De Economist, 157 (2), June, 129–207

PART II ISSUES IN BANK REGULATION

8. Kenneth E. Scott (1977), ‘The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation’, Stanford Law Review, 30 (1), November, 1–50

9. Henry N. Butler and Jonathan R. Macey (1988), ‘The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System’, Cornell Law Review, 73 (4), May, 677–718

10. Roberta Romano (2014), ‘For Diversity in the International Regulation of Financial Institutions: Critiquing and Recalibrating the Basel Architecture’, Yale Journal on Regulation, 31 (1), Winter, 1–76

11. Brett McDonnell and Daniel Schwarcz (2011), ‘Regulatory Contrarians’, North Carolina Law Review, 89 (5), 1629–79

12. James R. Barth, Gerard Caprio Jr. and Ross Levine (2004), ‘Bank Regulation and Supervision: What Works Best?’, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 13 (2), April, 205–48

13. Eric Posner and E. Glen Weyl (2013), ‘Benefit-Cost Analysis for Financial Regulation’, American Economic Review, 103 (3), May, 1–5

PART III GOVERNANCE

14. KJ Hopt (2013), ‘Corporate Governance of Banks and Other Financial Institutions After the Financial Crisis’, Journal of Corporate Law Studies, 13 (2), October, 219–53

15. Lucian A. Bebchuk (2010), ‘How to Fix Bankers’ Pay’, Daedalus, 139 (4), Fall, 52–60

PART IV CENTRAL BANKS

16. C A E Goodhart (2010), ‘The Changing Role of Central Banks’, Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Working Papers, 326, vii, ix, 1–23

17. Ben S. Bernanke and Mark Gertler (2001), ‘Should Central Banks Respond to Movements in Asset Prices?’, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 91 (2), May, 253–7

18. Alberto Alesina and Lawrence H. Summers (1993), ‘Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 25 (2), May, 151–62

PART V CONSUMER BANKING

19. Oren Bar-Gill (2009), ‘The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts’, Cornell Law Review, 94, 1073–151

20. Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth Warren (2008), ‘Making Credit Safer’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 157 (1), November, 1–101

21. Michael S. Barr (2004), ‘Microfinance and Financial Development’, Michigan Journal of International Law, 26 (27), Fall, 271–96

Index