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Foreword
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xiii
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Preface
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xv
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List of abbreviations
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xx
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1 Introduction
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1
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1 The autumn of 2008
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1
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2 Why the GFC was not prevented?
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2
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3 Why is finance so important?
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4
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3.1 Overview
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4
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3.2 Should finance be regulated?
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6
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5 Whither governance of global financial markets?
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12
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5.1 The book’s subject matter
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12
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5.2 Towards a new governance model
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12
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6 Book structure
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15
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Part I Financial markets and financial crises
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19
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2 Financial markets and financial crises
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21
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1 Introduction
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21
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2 The important functions of the financial system
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23
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2.1 How financial systems foster economic growth
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23
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2.2 Mobilization, pooling of savings and ease of exchange
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24
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2.3 Information production, facilitation of investor (saver) monitoring and capital allocation
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26
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2.4 Risk management and risk reduction
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27
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2.5 Corporate governance
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29
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2.6 Evidence of the strong link between developed financial systems and economic growth
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30
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2.7 FSD, availability of finance and poverty alleviation
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32
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3 Evolution of global markets and financial innovation
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35
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3.1 Complex instruments and international financial markets
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35
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3.2 The different classes of derivatives contracts
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36
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3.3 Securitization and structured finance
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40
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3.4 Credit derivatives
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47
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3.5 Shadow banking
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51
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4 Efficient markets, inefficient markets, adaptive markets
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54
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4.1 Introductory remarks
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54
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4.2 Efficient Markets Hypothesis versus Behavioural Finance
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57
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4.3 Other puzzles
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61
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4.4 Adaptive markets
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62
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5 The neo-liberal consensus policies and the growth of global financial markets
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64
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5.1 The Jackson Hole Consensus
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64
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5.2 Deregulation
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67
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5.3 Washington Consensus policies
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70
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6 Financial markets and financial crises
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72
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6.1 The Asian Crisis
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72
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6.2 The Global Financial Crisis
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74
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6.3 Are financial markets inherently unstable?
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79
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7 Summary of findings
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88
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3 The causes of the Global Financial Crisis
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89
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1 Introduction
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89
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2 Macro-causes
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92
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2.1 Global trade imbalances and lax monetary policies
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92
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2.2 The flawed use of financial innovation
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96
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2.3 Failed government policies
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106
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2.4 Neo-liberal economic doctrine and deregulation
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110
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2.5 Irrational exuberance and other behavioural causes
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121
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3 Micro-causes: the issue of misaligned incentives
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126
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3.1 Executive compensation and corporate governance failures
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126
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3.2 The ‘originate-to-distribute’ model
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129
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3.3 The flawed information content and use of credit ratings
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130
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4 Flawed regulations
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133
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4.1 Capital and investor protection regulations
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133
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4.2 ‘Too-big-to-fail’ institutions and lack of cross-border special resolution regimes
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134
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5 Market failure, regulatory failure and the financial revolution
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136
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5.1 An alternative explanation of market and regulatory failure?
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136
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5.2 Complexity, emergence and the GFC
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142
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5.3 The role of insider rent-seeking
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146
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5.4 A knowledge revolution
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150
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6 Concluding remarks
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154
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Part II The evolution of governance structures for international finance
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155
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4 The evolution of global financial governance and development of International Financial Regulation
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157
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1 Introduction
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157
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2 The Bretton Woods and post-Bretton Woods phase
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159
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2.1 Introductory remarks
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159
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2.2 Monetary stability – financial stability and the IMF
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162
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2.3 The origins of TRNs and of standard setting
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165
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2.4 The most important TRNs of the post-Bretton Woods period
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168
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2.5 Reconstruction, development and the World Bank
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179
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2.6 Trade liberalization and financial services: from the ITO to the WTO
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182
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3 Intermediate phase: a ‘New International Financial Architecture’ (1998–2008)
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185
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3.1 An overview of the NIFA
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185
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3.2 The evolution of standard setting bodies and financial standards during NIFA
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189
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3.3 Implementation – monitoring and the FSAP surveys
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199
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3.4 A critique of NIFA
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203
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4 The emerging architecture
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204
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4.1 Introductory remarks
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204
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4.2 The emergence of the G-20
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205
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4.3 The IMF
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206
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4.4 From the FSF to the FSB
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207
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4.5 The supervisory colleges
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209
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5 Summary and concluding remarks
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210
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5 The ‘softness’ of soft law and global financial governance
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213
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1 Introduction
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213
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2 What is international financial regulation?
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217
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2.1 Regulation rationales
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217
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2.2 The advantages of soft law and TRNs in the context of global financial governance
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221
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2.3 Soft law shortcomings
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225
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2.4 The issue of legitimacy
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232
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3 Can soft law financial governance meet the challenges? Lessons from the GFC
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236
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3.1 Introductory remarks
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236
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3.2 The flaws of the Basel capital framework
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237
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3.3 Regulatory arbitrage through asset transformation, credit ratings and other follies
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238
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3.4 The systemic implications of neglecting liquidity
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240
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3.5 Flawed risk models and procyclicality
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243
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4 Supervisory failures, cross-border crisis management and ‘too-big-to-fail’ institutions
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246
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4.1 Overview of the issue
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246
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4.2 A closer look at the Kaupthing, Fortis and Dexia cases
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249
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4.3 Lack of cross-border resolution regimes and ‘too-big-to-fail’ institutions
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252
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5 What should be done?
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256
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Part III Regulatory reform and a new governance model for global financial markets
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259
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6 Regulatory and supervisory reform: US, EU, BCBS
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261
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1 Introduction
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261
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1.1 Overview
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261
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1.2 Summary of reforms
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262
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2 Critical aspects of the Dodd–Frank Act
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272
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2.1 Supervision of SIFIs and systemic risk oversight under the Dodd–Frank Act
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272
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2.2. Regulation of derivatives markets under the Dodd–Frank Act
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280
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2.3 Registration of hedge fund advisers
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288
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3 Regulatory and supervisory reform in the EU
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289
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3.1 The first attempt to reform EU financial regulation
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289
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3.2 The European system of financial supervision
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302
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4 The new Basel capital and liquidity framework
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321
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4.1 Minimum capital requirements and composition of capital
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321
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4.2 Capital buffers
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324
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4.3 Containing leverage
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330
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4.4 Liquidity ratios
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332
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4.5 Risk management and supervision
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341
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4.6 Evaluation of Basel III
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344
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7 Global reform of the ‘too-big-to-fail’ institution and the new resolution regimes in the US and the EU
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348
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1 Introduction
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348
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2 FSB principles for the supervision of SIFIs
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351
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3 Targeting bank size and speculative banking activities
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352
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3.1 The Volcker Rule
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352
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3.2 Ban on proprietary trading
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354
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3.3 Limited sponsoring or investing in private equity and hedge funds
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356
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3.4 The regime for non-bank financial companies
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358
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3.5 UK proposals on the structure of the banking industry
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359
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4 Increased capital requirements for SIFIs and G-SIFIs
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360
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4.1 Contingent capital instruments
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360
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4.2 Capital surcharges
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368
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5 BCBS-FSB principles on cross-border SIFI resolution
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370
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5.1 What is the problem?
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370
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5.2 BCBS, FSB and IMF recommendations on cross-border resolution
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373
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6 The Dodd–Frank Act resolution regime for SIFIs
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381
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6.1 Enhanced supervision and failure prevention
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381
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6.2 Orderly Liquidation Authority
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384
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6.3 Evaluation
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393
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7 The proposed EU crisis management and resolution framework
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394
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7.1 General principles
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394
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7.2 Preparation, early intervention and prevention
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396
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7.3 Recovery plans and group recovery plans
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401
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7.4 Resolution plans
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403
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7.5 Early intervention powers
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407
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7.6 Resolution powers and tools
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409
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7.7 Financing resolution
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422
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7.8 Evaluation of the EU resolution regime
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424
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8 Summary and conclusions
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425
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8 An evolutionary model for global financial governance
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429
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1 Introductory remarks
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429
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1.1 Overview
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429
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1.2 Summary of the proposal
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432
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2 The proposed global regulatory framework
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435
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2.1 General principles: the importance of shared values
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435
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2.2 The global macro-prudential supervisor
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440
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2.3 A global micro-prudential authority
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442
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2.4 Global financial policy, regulation and risk knowledge authority
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447
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2.5 A global resolution authority
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451
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2.6 Other advantages of the proposed governance system
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454
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3 Conclusion
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457
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Index
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460
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