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International Law for Freshwater Protection

International Law for Freshwater Protection

Name: International Law for Freshwater Protection
Brand: Brill Nijhoff
SKU: 9789004511828
Price: 2074.80 HKD
Availability: InStock
Author: Agnes Chong
ISBN: 9789004511828

By Agnes Chong

Brill Nijhoff April 2022

Specifications

ISBN-13: 9789004511828
Publisher: Brill Nijhoff
Publication: April 2022
Format: Hardback
Jurisdiction: Netherlands ? Countri(es) for reference only

Details

International Law for Freshwater Protection traces the development of international water law on fresh water protection and demonstrates how the regime focuses on the utilisation and rights of sovereign states over the protection and sustainable growth of shared water resources. The evolving jurisprudence influenced by environmental law highlights the regime's insufficient focus on the environmental protection of watercourses. This book argues that existing rules, mechanisms and norms within international law can address the regime's imbalance and establish how these might be applied to improve freshwater protection.

Preface; Introduction; 1.
Freshwater Protection Regime: 1.
Introduction: 2.
Development of Watercourses Law: 2.1 Navigational Uses; 2.2 Non-Navigational Uses; 3.
Theories of Utilisation: 3.1 Absolute Territorial Sovereignty; 3.2 Absolute Territorial Integrity; 3.3 Limited Territorial Sovereignty; 3.4 Community of Interest; 4.
International Treaty Regime: 4.1 UN Watercourses Convention; 4.2 Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers; 4.3 unece Water Convention; 5.
Customary International Law: 6.
International Environmental Legal Regime: 7.
Evolving Legal Regime: 8.
Norms of Conservation and Preservation: 9.
Sustainable Development: 2.
Definitions of Freshwater Protection: 1.
Introduction: 2.
Sources of Freshwater Harm: 3.
What Is Harm?: 3.1 Dictionary Meanings; 3.2 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; 4.
Definitions of International Watercourses: 5.
"Uses" versus "Effects": 6.
Rejecting a Broad Definition and the Geographical Rationale: 7.
The Separation of "Uses" and "Effects" within the Regime: 8.
The Focus on "Uses" or "Utilisation" in the 1997 Watercourses Convention: 9.
Evolving International Law and the Parameters of States' Obligations: 3.
Rules and Principles of International Water Law: 1.
Introduction: 2.
Background to the 1997 Watercourses Convention: 3.
Regime Framework: The 1997 Watercourses Convention: 3.1 Principles of Equitable Utilisation, No-Harm and Cooperation; 3.2 Principles of Prior Notification and Prior Consultation; 3.3 Principles of Prevention, Protection and Conservation; 3.4 Precautionary Principle; 3.5 Contemporary Issues; 4.
The Hierarchy Question of Equitable Utilisation and No-Harm: 4.1 Inference of Hierarchy Was a Drafting Issue at the ilc; 4.2 No Hierarchy in Text of Article 7; 4.3 Consequences of an Inference of Hierarchy of Equitable Utilisation over No-Harm; 4.
The Relationship between Equitable Utilisation and No-Harm: 1.
Introduction: 2.
Assumption of a Hierarchical Relationship: 3.
Conflation of the No-Harm Maxims in the Two Rules: 4.
No-Harm Maxim's Dual Limitation on State Activity: Theoretical Principles of the 1997 Watercourses Convention: 4.1 Theories of International Water Law; 4.2 Limited Sovereignty and the Limiting Role on the Freedom on States; 4.3 Principle of Sovereign Equality and Equitable Utilisation (Underlying the Water Allocation Doctrine); 4.4 Principle of Sic Utere Tuo Ut Alienum Non Laedas and No-Harm (Underlying the Water Quality Doctrine); 5.
Resolutions of the Institute of International Law: 5.1 1911 Madrid Declaration: Two Limiting Roles of Harm; 5.2 1961 Salzburg Resolution: Does Not Prohibit Harm; 5.3 1979 Athens Resolution: Prohibits Harm; 5.4 Contrasting Application of Equitable Utilisation in the 1979 Athens Resolution and in the 1982 Montreal Rules; 6.
Merger of No-Harm with Equitable Utilisation: 7.
Concerns that the Convention Is Biased towards Downstream States: 8.
Interpreting the Law to Make the Law a Level Playing Field: 9.
Indeterminate Nature of Articles 7 and 5: 10.
Lawful State Activity: 11.
Conclusion: 5.
The International Jurisprudence on "Due Regard": 1.
Introduction: 2.
Due Regard as a Limitation on the Freedom of States: 2.1 Definition of Due Regard and Its Evolution from Reasonable Regard; 2.1.1 Definition of Due Regard; 2.1.2 Evolution from Reasonable Regard to Due Regard; 2.2 Rising Demands on the Use of Waters and the Greater Role of "Due Regard"; 3.
The Nature of the "Due Regard" Obligation: 3.1 Chagos: Consultation Is a Necessary Application of Due Regard; 3.2 South China Sea Arbitration: Due Regard Obligation Requires Specific Course of Action of Compliance; 3.3 Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v Iceland) and (Germany v Iceland): Due Regard for the Rights of Other States and the Needs of Conservation; 3.4 Arctic Sunrise Arbitration: Due Regard for State Interests and Other Rights under unclos; 3.5 itlos Fisheries Advisory Opinion: Regime of Compliance Included the Due Regard Obligation; 3.6 The M/V "Virginia G" Case Panama/Guinea-Bissau: Reciprocal Rights to Explore Must Have Due Regard for the Conservation and Management of Natural Resources and Relevant Circumstances; 3.7 The Substance of the Principle of Due Regard: The Standard of Reasonableness; 4.
The Due Regard Analysis: 4.1 High Seas; 4.1.1 unclos and the Due Regard Provisions; 4.2 Outer Space; 4.2.1 The Outer Space Treaties and Due Regard Provisions; 4.2.1.1 The 1967 Outer Space Treaty; 4.2.1.2 The 1979 Moon Agreement; 4.2.2 The Overriding Emphasis on International Peace and Security and the Common Heritage of Mankind; 4.3 International Civil Aviation; 4.3.1 The Chicago Convention and the Due Regard Provisions; 4.3.2 The Overriding Emphasis on Aviation Safety; 4.3.3 Due Regard Obligations; 4.3.4 Due Regard Operations; 5.
Balance of Rights and Duties in a Due-Regard Formula: 5.1 Environmental Due-Regard Formula; 5.2 The Factorial Approach: Implications of a Due-Regard Formula; 6.
Conclusion: 6.
The Non-applicability of Hierarchical Norms under International Law: 1.
Introduction: 2.
Hierarchy in International Law: 2.1 International Constitutionalism, Jus Cogens and Norms Accepted by the "International Community of States as a Whole"; 2.2 Hierarchy of Norms; 2.3 Politics of Apportionment Affects Interpretation of the Law; 2.3.1 State Sovereignty; 2.3.2 A Hierarchy Needed to Adjust the "Inequitable Effects" of Article 7; 3.
No Hierarchy of Sources, but Hierarchy of Norms: 3.1 No Hierarchy of Sources of Law and the Nicaragua Case; 3.2 Hierarchy of Norms and the Nicaragua Case; 4.
Non-Applicability of Hierarchy of Norms to Equitable Utilisation and No-Harm Rules: 4.1 Conditions a Hierarchy May Be Applied: Jus Cogens, Crimes of State, Obligations Erga Omnes and Article 103 of the UN Charter; 4.1.1 Jus Cogens; 4.1.2 Crimes of the State; 4.1.3 Obligations Erga Omnes; 4.1.4 Article 103 of the UN Charter; 5.
No Justification for the Application of Hierarchy: 5.1 The Gabcikovo Case: No Hierarchy between Equitable Utilisation and No-Harm; 5.1.1 Background to the Case; 5.1.2 Act by Hungary; 5.1.3 Act by Slovakia; 5.1.4 Competing Equitable Utilisation Rights; 5.1.5 Making Reparations: Court's Ruling on Harm Caused; 6.
Commentators Claim "Harm is Permissible": 6.1 "Mixing the Apples and Oranges"; 6.2 Harm Is Not Permissible; 6.2.1 Harm in Relation to Equitable Utilisation; 6.2.2 Harm in Relation to No-Harm; 7.
Conclusion: 7.
The Due Diligence Obligation: 1.
Introduction: 2.
State Responsibility and Prevention of Harm: 3.
The Meaning of Due Diligence: 4.
Due Diligence Obligation: 5.
Significant Harm: 6.
The 2001 Prevention Articles as the Basis of Prevention of Risk of Harm: 7.
The Emergence of the Positive Obligation to Prevent Risk of Harm: 8.
Standard of Conduct: 9.
Positive Obligations in Water Law: 10.
Conclusion: 8.
Case Study of the Mekong River Commission: 1.
International Water Law: The Cooperation Mechanism: 2.
Case Study of the 1995 Mekong Agreement and the Practice of the Mekong River Commission: 2.1 The Formation of the 1995 Mekong Agreement; 2.2 The Practice of the Mekong River Commission; 3.
Conclusion: 9.
Conclusion: 1.
Introduction: 2.
Issues in the Freshwater Protection Regime: 3.
Reasons Underlying Preoccupation of the Regime with Allocation of Uses: 3.1 Interpreting "having due regard for" Leads to a Balance of Obligations, Not an Inference of a Hierarchy; 3.2 No Relevant Basis in International Law to Imply a Hierarchy; 3.3 Assumptions of a Hierarchy; 4.
Implications of Research: Index