Law And Economics Of Mergers And Acquisitions

Volume I:

Acknowledgements

Introduction Steven M. Davidoff and Claire A. Hill

PART I BACKGROUND: HISTORY, RATIONALES AND OUTCOMES 
1. Henry G. Manne (1965), ‘Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control’
2. Michael Jensen (1989), ‘Eclipse of the Public Corporation’
3. Bernard S. Black (1989), ‘Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers’
4. Robert F. Bruner (2004), ‘Does M&A Pay?’
5. Ulrike Malmendier and Geoffrey Tate (2008), ‘Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the Market’s Reaction’

PART II WHAT M&A LAWYERS DO 
6. Ronald J. Gilson (1984), ‘Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing’
7. Claire A. Hill (2001), ‘Why Contracts are Written in “Legalese”’
8. John C. Coates IV (2001), ‘Explaining Variations in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers’
9. Claire A. Hill (2009), ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the Lawsuit: A Social Norms Theory of Incomplete Contracts’

PART III HOW DEALS ARE DONE: BOARD FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
10. William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs and Leo E. Strine, Jr. (2002), ‘The Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide’
11. Stephen M. Bainbridge (2006), ‘Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers’
12. Matthew D. Cain and Steven M. Davidoff (2011), ‘Form over Substance? The Value of Corporate Process and Management Buy-Outs’

PART IV HOW DEALS ARE DONE: PROCESS 
13. Lawrence A. Hamermesh (2002), ‘A Kinder, Gentler Critique of Van Gorkom and its Less Celebrated Legacies’
14. Audra L. Boone and J. Harold Mulherin (2007), ‘How Are Firms Sold?’
15. Lawrence A. Hamermesh and Michael L. Wachter (2009), ‘Rationalizing Appraisal Standards in Compulsory Buyouts’

PART V DEFENDING THE CORPORATE BASTION: PROTECTIVE DEVICES GENERALLY 
16. Martin Lipton and Paul K. Rowe (2002), ‘Pills, Polls, and Professors: A Reply to Professor Gilson’
17. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian (2002), ‘The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy’
18. Brett H. McDonnell (2005), ‘Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and Poison Pills’

Volume II:

Acknowledgements

An introduction by the editors to both volumes appears in Volume I

PART I RESPONDING TO A HOSTILE APPROACH 
1. Guhan Subramanian (2003), ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses’
2. Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock (2002), ‘How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law’
3. Bernard Black and Reinier Kraakman (2002), ‘Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden Value’

PART II PROTECTING THE DEAL 
4. John C. Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian (2000), ‘A Buy-Side Model of M&A Lockups: Theory and Evidence’
5. Brian J.M. Quinn (2007), ‘Bulletproof: Mandatory Rules for Deal Protection’
6. Guhan Subramanian (2008), ‘Go-Shops vs. No-Shops in Private Equity Deals: Evidence and Implications’ 

PART III TERMINATING THE DEAL 
7. Afra Afsharipour (2010), ‘Transforming the Allocation of Deal Risk Through Reverse Termination Fees’
8. Ronald J. Gilson and Alan Schwartz (2005), ‘Understanding MACS: Moral Hazard in Acquisitions’

PART IV PRIVATE EQUITY
9. William W. Bratton (2008), ‘Private Equity’s Three Lessons for Agency Theory’
10. Brian Cheffins and John Armour (2008), ‘The Eclipse of Private Equity’
11. Steven M. Davidoff (2009), ‘The Failure of Private Equity’ 

PART V INTERNATIONAL ISSUES 
12. John Armour and David A. Skeel, Jr. (2007), ‘Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? – The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation’
13. Guido Ferrarini and Geoffrey P. Miller (2009), ‘A Simple Theory of Takeover Regulation in the United States and Europe’
14. Christian Kirchner and Richard W. Painter (2002), ‘Takeover Defenses Under Delaware Law, the Proposed Thirteenth EU Directive and the New German Takeover Law: Comparison and Recommendations for Reform’
15. Paul L. Davies, Edmund-Philipp Schuster and Emilie Van de Walle de Ghelcke (2010), ‘The Takeover Directive as a Protectionist Tool?’