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| <i>You cannot learn to ride a bicycle from a book, and I claim the same is true for coping with uncertainty. Paradoxically, this book attempts to do what it claims is impossible.</i> |      |

## FOUNDATIONS

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| <i>In planning for the future, uncertain outcomes are often replaced with single, so-called average numbers. This leads to a class of systematic errors that I call the Flaw of Averages, which explains among other things why forecasts are always wrong.</i> |    |
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