
Contents

Introduction	1
The Problem	1
The Practice Theory of Law	2
The Philosophy of Pragmatic Rationalism	4
Plan of the Book	10
Part One The Grounds of Knowledge	13
1 Knowledge and Objectivity	15
1.1 Introduction	15
1.2 Objectivity as Asymmetry	18
1.3 Conceptions of Objectivity	23
1.4 Wittgenstein's Idea of Grammar	35
2 Objectivity and Grammar	39
2.1 Introduction	39
2.2 Intentional Realism	42
2.3 An Anti-representationalist Theory of Content	48
2.4 Mind-independence and Realism	58
2.5 Inferentialism and Truth	68
2.6 Grammar, Criteria and the Need for Practice	79
3 Grammar and Rule-following	87
3.1 Introduction	87
3.2 Rule-following and Content	90
3.3 Conceptions of Practice	99
3.4 Beyond Mind-World Dualism	110
3.5 Meaning, Use and Truth	114
4 Practice, Normativity and Reasons	127
4.1 Introduction	127
4.2 Reasons and the Reflexive Character of Practice	128
4.3 Grammar as the Fundamental Practice	136
4.4 Grammar, Persons and Autonomy	141
4.5 Pragmatic Rationalism	151
4.6 Where does Law Fit in All This?	156

Part Two Knowledge and Legal Theory	159
5 Conventionalism and the Grammar of Law	161
5.1 Introduction	161
5.2 Conceptual Analysis and the Grammar of Law	163
5.3 The External and the Internal Aspect of Rules: Legal Theory's Split Personality	173
5.4 Two Criticisms	178
5.5 Conclusion	182
6 Interpretivism and the Menace of Essentialism	185
6.1 Introduction	185
6.2 Interpretivism and the Depth of Practice	188
6.3 Rationalist Objectivity	195
6.4 Anti-rationalism and the Rejection of Grammar	198
6.5 Normativity of Practice	207
7 The Practice Theory of Law	211
7.1 Introduction	211
7.2 Failure of Conventionalism and Interpretivism	213
Concluding Remarks	239
The Practice Theory of Law in a Nutshell	239
Outcomes and Some Applications	240
<i>Bibliography</i>	249
<i>Index</i>	259

<http://www.pbookshop.com>