

# Contents

<i>Acknowledgements</i>	vii
<b>1. Introduction</b>	1
1.1 Terrorism and the State	1
1.2 The Law of State Responsibility for Private Acts	3
1.3 The Challenge of September 11th	5
1.4 Overview of Research	6
<b>Part I: State Responsibility for Private Acts: Theory and Practice</b>	
<b>2. State Responsibility for Private Acts: The Evolution of a Doctrine</b>	11
2.1 Introduction	11
2.2 The Origin of State Responsibility and the General Principle of Non-Attribution of Private Acts	12
2.3 The Doctrine of Collective Responsibility	13
2.4 The Theory of Complicity	14
2.5 The Janes Case	17
2.6 The Condonation Theory and the Calculation of Damage	19
2.7 The Separate Delict Theory	24
2.7.1 Introduction	24
2.7.2 Arbitral Awards	24
2.7.3 Codification Efforts	27
2.7.4 State Practice	32
2.7.5 Publicists	36
2.8 The Presentation of the Separate Delict Theory to the ILC	38
2.9 Conclusion	42
<b>3. The Agency Paradigm: The Principle of Non-Attribution and its Exceptions</b>	43
3.1 The Principle of Non-Attribution of Private Acts and the Separate Delict Theory: The ILC Text and the Claim of Universal Application.	43
3.2 Recent Applications of the Separate Delict Theory	46
3.2.1 Injury to Aliens and the Iran-US Claims Tribunal	46
3.2.2 Human Rights	50
3.2.3 International Environmental Law	57
3.2.4 Other Legal Obligations to Regulate Non-State Conduct	62

x	<i>Contents</i>	
	3.2.5 Observations	65
	3.3 The Exceptions	66
	3.3.1 Attribution of Conduct of De Facto State Agents	66
	3.3.2 Attribution of Conduct Adopted by the State	72
	3.3.3 Attribution of Conduct of Agents of Necessity and Insurrectional Movements	75
	3.4 Conclusion	78
	<b>Part II State Responsibility for Private Acts of Terrorism: Conventional Perspectives</b>	
4.	<b>To Prevent and to Abstain: International Obligations of States with Respect to Terrorism</b>	83
	4.1 Introduction	83
	4.2 Towards a Definition of Terrorism	84
	4.2.1 Recent Developments in the Definition of Terrorism	86
	4.2.2 The Search for a Definition Before 9/11	89
	4.2.3 Changes in the Attitude towards Terrorism at the United Nations	95
	4.2.4 The Draft Comprehensive Convention and the Search for a Legal Definition after 9/11	99
	4.2.5 The Emerging Consensus?	110
	4.2.6 A Working Definition of Terrorism	116
	4.3 Counter-Terrorism Obligations of the State:	118
	4.3.1 Counter-Terrorism Obligations before 9/11	118
	4.3.2 Legal Developments Following 9/11: Resolution 1373 and the CTC	122
	4.3.3 Re-Conceptualizing the Duty: Expectation and Reality	130
	4.4 The Standard of Care and the Burden of Proof: Determining State Responsibility for Violations of Counter-Terrorism Obligations	131
	4.4.1 General Observations	131
	4.4.2 The Role of Knowledge	133
	4.4.3 The Role of Fault	136
	4.4.4 Due Diligence, Capacity and the Problem of the Failing State	140
	4.4.5 The Burden of Proof	146
	4.4.6 Assessing Violations of Counter-Terrorism Obligations The Duty to Prevent and to Abstain	151
	4.5 Conclusion	152
5.	<b>State Responsibility for Private Acts of Terrorism</b>	155
	5.1 A Distinction with a Difference	155
	5.1.1 The Heuristic Dimension: A Preview	155
	5.1.2 The Role of the State	156

5.1.3 Political Accountability	157
5.1.4 Forcible Responses to Private Acts of Terrorism	158
5.1.5 Application of the Laws of Armed Conflict	165
5.1.6 Damages	167
5.2 State Responsibility for Private Acts of Terrorism before September 11: Three Theories	169
5.2.1 Terrorism and the Agency Paradigm	170
5.2.2 Absolute Responsibility	173
5.2.3 A Return to the Theory of Complicity	174
5.3 Use of Force as <i>Lex Specialis</i>	176
5.4 State Practice before September 11th	185
5.4.1 Looking at State Practice	185
5.4.2 State Responses to Terrorism: A Survey	186
5.4.3 An Analysis of State Practice	206
5.5 Conclusion	209
<b>6. The Challenge of September 11th and the Academic Response</b>	<b>211</b>
6.1 September 11th and the International Reaction	211
6.2 The Academic Response	219
6.2.1 The Agency Paradigm and the Illegality of Operation Enduring Freedom	219
6.2.2 The Agency Paradigm and the Legality of Operation Enduring Freedom	222
6.2.3 Use of Force Rules as a Justification	227
6.2.4 Other Possible Justifications for Operation Enduring Freedom	229
6.2.5 A New Rule	231
6.3 Conclusion: The Dissonance between Theory and Practice	238
<b>7. Inadequacies of Existing Approaches to State Responsibility for Terrorism</b>	<b>239</b>
7.1 Introduction	239
7.2 Contemporary Forms of State Involvement in Terrorism	240
7.2.1 Forms and Degrees of State Involvement in Terrorism	240
7.2.2 The Changing Nature of the Terrorist Threat	249
7.3 The Inadequacies of the Agency Paradigm	257
7.3.1 Conceptual, Policy and Evidentiary Problems	257
7.3.2 From Injury to Aliens to Terrorism: Questioning the Universal Application of ILC Principles	261
7.3.3 The Nicaragua Problem: Weaknesses with the Standard Case Law Analogies	266
7.4 The Inadequacies of Use of Force Standards	268
7.5 The Inadequacies of Absolute or Strict Responsibility	269
7.6 Towards a Model of State Responsibility for Terrorism: The Inter-penetration of the Public and Private Sphere	272

xii *Contents*

7.6.1	The Public/Private Distinction and the Role of the State in the Private Sphere	273
7.6.2	The Crime/War Distinction and the Role of the Non-State Actor in the Public Sphere	277
7.6.3	Towards a Model of State Responsibility for Terrorism: Complicity and Causation	280
7.7	Conclusion	281
<b>Part III: State Responsibility for Terrorism: A Causal Analysis</b>		
8.	<b>Causation-based Responsibility</b>	285
8.1	Introduction: Agency and Causation	285
8.2	A Word about Private Law Analogies	287
8.3	Common Sense Causation: Some Basic Principles	289
8.3.1	Methodology	289
8.3.2	Beyond the 'But For' Test	291
8.3.3	The Essence of Common Sense Causation	293
8.3.4	Omissions	294
8.3.5	Occasioning Harm and the 'Problem' of the Intervening Actor	297
8.3.6	Causation and Responsibility	303
8.4	Echoes of Causation-based Responsibility in International Law	306
8.4.1	Understanding the Relationship between Attribution, Causation and State Responsibility	306
8.4.2	Causation-based State Responsibility in International Law	308
8.4.3	Causation-based Responsibility and the Separate Delict Theory	322
8.5	Conclusion	329
9.	<b>Causation-based State Responsibility for Terrorism</b>	331
9.1	Introduction	331
9.2	A Causal Model of State Responsibility for Terrorism:	332
9.2.1	The Role of Attribution	332
9.2.2	The Role of Illegality	333
9.2.3	The Role of Causation	333
9.2.4	The Role of Non-causal Considerations	336
9.3	Returning to the Problem of Burden of Proof	340
9.4	Testing the Practical Viability of a Causal Model	348
9.4.1	Explaining the Response to September 11th	348
9.4.2	More Problematic Factual Scenarios Applying a Four-step Process	351
9.5	Conclusion: The Policy Benefits of a Causal Model and its Status under International Law	357
10.	<b>Concluding Observations</b>	361
	<i>Select Bibliography</i>	365
	<i>Index</i>	385