

Summary Contents

<i>Table of Cases</i>	xxi
1. The Role of Institutional Theory in a Constitutional System	1
2. The Tripartite Separation of Powers Theory	18
3. Institutional Legitimacy and the Administrative State	46
4. The Search for Institutional Legitimacy	76
5. A New Theory of Institutional Separation	106
6. Institutional Legitimacy and Administrative Practice	137
7. The Relationship between the Administration and the Other Branches	183
8. From Exception to Orthodoxy? The Theory in Action	205
9. Conclusions: A Republican Theory of Institutional Separation?	253
<i>Selected Bibliography</i>	267
<i>Index</i>	273

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Detailed Contents

Table of Cases

xxi

1	The Role of Institutional Theory in a Constitutional System	1
	A. Introduction	1
	B. Constitutionalism and the State	2
	(1) The Social Significance of a Constitution	2
	(2) The State, Politics, and Internal Social Divisions	4
	C. A Political Tool?—The Constitution as Unifying Force	5
	(1) Substantive Constitutional Values	5
	(2) The Institutional Arrangement	7
	(3) The Problem of Inevitable Conflict	8
	D. The Constitution and Changing Social Tastes	8
	(1) Unifying by Example	8
	(2) Unifying by Reaction and Response	10
	E. Conclusion	15
2	The Tripartite Separation of Powers Theory	18
	A. A Universal Separation of Powers Doctrine?	18
	(1) The Problems of a 'Pure' Theory	18
	(2) The Ubiquity of the Institutional Trinity	21
	B. The Separation of Powers as an Effective Institutional Theory	22
	(1) Indeterminacy as an Institutional Problem	22
	(2) Indeterminacy in Action	22
	(3) Indeterminacy of Objectives	27
	(4) The Theory in the Courts	28
	(5) The Historical Origins of the Uncertainty	32
	C. Value Shaping and the Separation of Powers	33
	(1) The Problem of Hidden Normative Judgements	33
	(2) Public Opinion and the Separation of Powers	37
	D. Conclusion	44
3	Institutional Legitimacy and the Administrative State	46
	A. A New Understanding of the Administration?	46
	(1) Exceptions, Counterprinciples, and the Process of Reform	46
	B. Administrative Power	48
	(1) The Need for Normative Justification	48
	(2) The Legitimacy of Discretionary Power	49
	(3) The 'Transmission Belt' Theory and the Courts	51

C.	The <i>Imperium</i> Model of Government	53
(1)	Electoral Legitimacy and the Sovereign Power	53
(2)	Sovereign Authority and the Democratic State	54
(3)	Sovereign Authority and the Limits of State Power	54
D.	<i>Imperium</i> and the Administrative State	56
(1)	<i>Imperium</i> Under Pressure	56
(2)	The Interventionist State	56
(3)	The Decentralization of Public Power	58
(4)	The Place of Rules in the Administrative State	58
(5)	Accountability Issues	59
(6)	The Citizen–State Relationship Redefined	63
E.	The <i>Imperium</i> Model and the Courts	65
(1)	The Judicial Response	65
(2)	The Public–Private Distinction	66
(3)	The Relaxation of the Standing Rules	67
(4)	Increasing Standards of Review	69
(5)	Procedural Fairness	71
(6)	Legitimate Expectations	73
F.	Conclusion	73
4	The Search for Institutional Legitimacy	76
A.	Issues of Institutional Design	76
(1)	The Need for a New Model of Separation	76
(2)	Assessing Institutional Success	76
(3)	The Failure of the Traditional Separation of Powers Theory	77
(4)	Justice as Legitimacy	79
B.	The Search for Legitimizing Process Values	82
(1)	Democracy, Accountability, and Consent	82
(2)	The Majoritarian Idea of Legitimacy	85
C.	Individualism in a Democratic State	89
(1)	Democracy as Equality	89
(2)	Democracy, Autonomy, and Consent	92
(3)	The Enduring Importance of the Individual	94
(4)	Individualism, Citizenship, and the State	96
(5)	Universality and the Philosophy of Kant	98
(6)	Universality, Rawls, and the Original Agreement	100
(7)	Respecting Individual Autonomy	101
(8)	Non-Arbitrariness as a Normative Value	104
D.	Conclusion	104
5	A New Theory of Institutional Separation	106
A.	Non-Arbitrariness and the Administrative State	106
(1)	Introduction	106
(2)	Administrative Discretion and Non-Arbitrariness	106
(3)	Non-Arbitrariness in the Courts	113

B.	A New Model of Non-Arbitrariness	118
	(1) Legitimate Governance and Arbitrary Rule	118
	(2) Alternative Institutions and the Allocation of Power	121
	(3) Addressing the Duality of Individual Interests	127
	(4) A Separation of Constituencies?	128
C.	Conclusion	134
6	Institutional Legitimacy and Administrative Practice	137
A.	Introduction	137
B.	The Necessity for Multi-Institutional Analysis	138
	Defining the Subject Matter	139
C.	The Characteristics of the Administration	141
	(1) Bureaucratic Principles	141
	(2) Information Costs	144
	(3) Expertise	145
	(4) Operational Autonomy	146
	(5) Flexibility	146
	(6) Administrative Characteristics	149
D.	Applied Multi-Institutional Analysis	149
	(1) Comparison with the Political Organs	149
	(2) Comparison with the Courts	153
	(3) Comparison with the Market	155
	(4) Comparative Conclusions	160
E.	External Implications for the Administration	162
F.	Internal Implications for the Administration	164
	(1) Appointment, Promotion, and Removal of Administrative Officials	164
	(2) Training	167
	(3) Self-Image of Officials	168
	(4) Internal Administrative Procedures	170
	(5) Powers	175
	(6) Reviews and Appeals	176
G.	Political Reforms of Administrative Practices	177
	(1) Macrory Report on <i>Regulatory Justice: Making Sanctions Effective</i>	178
	(2) First-Tier and Upper Tribunal	180
H.	Conclusion	182
7	The Relationship between the Administration and the Other Branches	183
A.	Introduction	183
B.	Relevant Political Principles	184
	(1) The Provisionality and Legitimacy of Institutional Perspectives	184
	(2) Coordinated Governance	186

C. The Inter-Institutional Relationship	187
(1) Institutional Blending	187
(2) The Giving of Reasons	188
D. The Administration	189
(1) Relationship with the Political Organs	190
(2) Relationship with the Courts	192
E. Regulating the Relationship	198
F. Conclusion	203
8 From Exception to Orthodoxy? The Theory in Action	205
A. Introduction	205
B. A Positive Conception of the Administrative Process	207
C. Of Vires and Values: The Changing Basis of Judicial Review	211
(1) Competing Conceptions of Administrative Action	211
(2) Ultra Vires and the Administration	212
(3) Ultra Vires under Strain	213
(4) Academic Criticism	219
(5) Changes in the Courts: The Decision in <i>Jackson</i>	221
(6) Judicial Review as an Independent Jurisdiction	224
D. The Search for Substantive Values	226
(1) The Doctrine of Legitimate Expectations	226
(2) The Doctrine of Proportionality	237
(3) The Duty to Give Reasons	243
(4) Regulating the Inter-Institutional Relationship	246
E. Conclusion	251
9 Conclusions: A Republican Theory of Institutional Separation?	253
A. The Myth of the Separation of Powers	253
B. The Problems of the Separation of Powers	253
C. The Theory and the Administrative State	255
D. A New Theory for an Administrative State	256
E. Republicanism and Mixed Government	258
F. The Commitment to the Common Good	262
G. The Character of the State and its Constituencies	263
H. Discretionary Power and Dialogic Institutional Interaction	265
<i>Selected Bibliography</i>	267
<i>Index</i>	273