

Contents

<i>Preface</i>	vii
1 The Idea of Autonomy	1
1.1 The Paradox of Autonomy	2
1.2 Autonomy and Authority	6
1.3 The Logic of Autonomy	10
1.3.1 How Not to Understand Autonomy	11
1.3.2 Structure of Autonomous Reasoning	13
1.3.3 Definitions of Autonomy	17
1.4 Central Issues in a Theory of Autonomous Reasoning	20
2 Normative Language	22
2.1 A Framework for Autonomous Reasoning	23
2.2 Norms, Normative Arguments, Judgements and Statements	24
2.2.1 Semantic Conception of Norms	25
2.2.2 Normative Statements	26
2.2.3 Normative Arguments	30
2.2.4 Structure of Autonomous Judgement	31
2.3 The Non-Propositionality Thesis	35
2.4 The Logic of Normative Argument	37
2.4.1 Inference Rules for Normative Arguments	38
2.4.2 Inference Rules for Normative Judgements and Statements	42
2.5 Conclusion	44
3 The Concept of Normative Arguments	45
3.1 Structure of Normative Arguments	45
3.2 Argument for the Reiteration of Requirements for Validity	48
3.2.1 Structure of Balancing	49
3.2.2 Structure of Normativity	52
3.2.3 Structure of Interest-based Arguments	54
3.2.4 Structure of Autonomy	55
3.2.5 Trilemma of Normative Justification	57
3.3 Objections and Problems	58
3.4 Conclusion	60

4	The Justification of Norms	62
4.1	Structure of Normative Justification	63
4.2	Procedural Elements of Normative Justification	66
4.2.1	Necessity of Argumentation	66
4.2.2	Rules of Argumentation	67
4.2.3	Autonomy Rights	69
4.3	Substantive Elements of Normative Justification	70
4.3.1	Normative Arguments and their Implications	70
4.3.2	Autonomous Normative Judgements	75
4.3.3	Statements of Binding Norms	82
4.4	Conclusion	84
5	Autonomous Balancing	85
5.1	Conceptions of Balancing	85
5.1.1	Balancing as Calculation	85
5.1.2	Balancing as Interpretation	86
5.1.3	Autonomous Balancing	87
5.2	The Model of Optimisation	90
5.2.1	Criterion of Pareto-Optimality	91
5.2.2	Indifference Curves	92
5.2.3	Optimality	92
5.3	Criteria of Balancing	93
5.3.1	Requirements of Correct Balancing	93
5.3.2	Factors of Balancing	94
5.3.3	Relative Weight in a Particular Case	96
5.3.4	Abstract Weight of Principles	97
5.3.5	Criteria of Abstract Weight	100
5.4	The indeterminacy of Balancing	102
5.5	Conclusion	105
6	Claims to Correctness, Validity and Objectivity	106
6.1	Claims to Correctness	107
6.1.1	Epistemic Correctness	107
6.1.2	Normative Correctness	108
6.2	Claim to Correctness of Autonomous Judgements	109
6.2.1	Normative Judgements as the Result of Balancing	110
6.2.2	Claim to Normative Correctness	112
6.3	Claims to Definitive Validity	113
6.3.1	Correctness of the Balancing	114
6.3.2	Mutual Respect for Autonomy	114

6.3.3	Universalisability and the Criterion of Consensus	115
6.3.4	Intersubjective Reflection	117
6.4	Claims to Objective Validity	118
6.4.1	Notion of Objective Validity	118
6.4.2	Criteria of Objective Validity	121
6.4.3	Objective Correctness of the Claim to Bindingness	122
6.4.4	Restricting Individual Autonomy	123
6.5	Conclusion	124
7	Rights	126
7.1	The Structure of Rights	126
7.1.1	Descriptively and Normatively Defined Normative Positions	128
7.1.2	Will Theory and Interest Theory of Rights	132
7.1.3	Types of Rights Content	133
7.2	A System of Rights	134
7.2.1	Liberty Rights	134
7.2.2	Claim Rights	135
7.2.3	Procedural and Substantive Rights	138
7.3	The Balancing of Rights	138
7.3.1	Rights and Rights-Claims	139
7.3.2	Rights as Trumps	139
7.4	Conclusion	140
8	Autonomy Rights, Human Rights and Fundamental Rights	142
8.1	The Idea of Universal Rights	143
8.2	Justification of Human Rights	145
8.2.1	Individual Autonomy	146
8.2.2	Specific Human Rights Principles	148
8.2.3	Exclusionary Human Rights Principles	149
8.2.4	Definitive Substantive Human Rights	150
8.3	Fundamental Rights	151
8.3.1	Concept of Fundamental Rights	151
8.3.2	Justification of Fundamental Rights	154
8.3.3	Fundamental Autonomy Rights	156
8.4	Conclusion	159
9	Legal Validity	161
9.1	Law as a Binding Public Order	161
9.2	Conceptions of Legal Validity	163

9.2.1	Empirical, Criterial and Applicative Conceptions of Validity	163
9.2.2	Absolute and System-relative Validity	165
9.3	Authoritative Character of Law	167
9.3.1	Formal Principles	167
9.3.2	Types of Authority	170
9.4	Legal and Moral Validity	171
9.4.1	Theses about Law and Morality	172
9.4.2	Moral Correctness as a Criterion of Legal Validity	174
9.5	Conclusion	181
10	Legal Interpretation and Autonomous Reasoning	183
10.1	Balancing, Interpretation and the Authoritative Structure of Law	184
10.2	Concept of Interpretation	185
10.3	Structure of Legal Interpretation	188
10.3.1	Constructive and Semantic Interpretation	188
10.3.2	Types of Constructive Interpretation	189
10.4	Competence and Legal Interpretation	194
10.4.1	Competence as to Open and Closed Balancing	195
10.4.2	Competence as to Incompletely Bound Balancing	196
10.4.3	Competing Competences with respect to Legal Interpretation	198
10.5	Conclusion	200
11	The Autonomy of Legal Systems	202
11.1	Concept of a Legal System	203
11.1.1	Definition	203
11.1.2	Systemic Legal Validity	204
11.1.3	The ACE Theory of Law	205
11.1.4	Structure of Criteria of Systemic Legal Validity	206
11.2	Types of Intersystemic Relation	208
11.2.1	Case of the Primacy of EU Law	209
11.2.2	Intersystemic Validation or Invalidation	210
11.2.3	Competing Requirements of Application	214
11.3	Definitions and General Theses	217
11.3.1	Independence	218
11.3.2	Dominance and Superiority	218
11.3.3	Autonomy of a Legal System	218
11.3.4	A-Systems and the Concept of Law	219

12 Conclusion	222
Appendix: Symbols, Key Notions and Rules of Argumentation	227
<i>Bibliography</i>	237
<i>Index</i>	245

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