


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Second Edition

# Tort Law in Hong Kong

## An Introductory Guide



Stephen D. Mau

# Contents

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## Foreword

Established in 1984, the Hong Kong Institute of Surveyors (HKIS) strives to serve the surveying profession. In 2010, the HKIS began sponsoring publication of reference books that are relevant to the needs and requirements of the local surveying practice. The HKIS is pleased to have funded another series of books authored by Stephen D. Mau. Like its sister publication, *Property Law in Hong Kong: An Introductory Guide* (second edition) by Stephen D. Mau, this second edition of his book on tort law in Hong Kong is not only intended for the surveying industry and its students, but also for the non-legal professional and the general public.

The real estate and construction-related industry has experienced substantial growth over the past few years. In response to this growth, there has been a large number of individuals interested in entering this industry and others in the industry who are interested in further advancing their careers by expanding their knowledge of law. This book serves both groups as this second edition of *Tort Law in Hong Kong: An Introductory Guide* has been revised, updated, and re-organized to enhance the reader's experience and understanding. The second edition continues to be written in non-legal English with a comprehensive endnotes section which provides further and more detailed explanations of the main text along with references for those who are interested.

This book comprises several chapters which discuss torts that are frequently encountered in daily activities. Hence, this book is relevant to both professionals and lay readers. It is also an excellent reference for undergraduate and postgraduate student studying courses related to the industry.

Sr Vincent Ho  
President

The Hong Kong Institute of Surveyors

nuisance.<sup>19</sup> Another authority is of the opinion that Rylands is less important with the development of the law of negligence of *Donoghue v Stevenson* in 1932.<sup>20</sup> In Australia, the case of *Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd* (1994) 179 CLR 520, the Rylands has been replaced by developments in the tort of negligence.

### C. Negligence

The broadest category of tort is the tort of negligence. The growing category in tort law and the most frequently litigated. The following two chapters concentrate on this category and set out the elements of the tort of negligence, then present the law available.

### D. Other Torts

In Chapter 5, there will be discussion of several other types of torts which are anticipated to have the most impact upon the general law of tortious liability of employers for the torts of their employees, including liability out of breach of statutory duty, occupier's liability, nuisance, and defamation. Each of these types of torts will be discussed in separate and distinctive sections within the chapter.

## 3

# Tort of Negligence

The tort of negligence is the right to protect one's self and one's property from harm caused by the unreasonable behaviour of another.<sup>1</sup> Negligence is defined as carelessness or lack of proper care and attention in performing some act.<sup>2</sup> A person is negligent as a tortfeasor, even if that person did not intend the consequences of the act (injury to another person or damage to another's property). Rather, the tortfeasor instead acted indifferently to (or, as unaware of) the consequences of his or her actions.<sup>3</sup> Another authority has compared negligence with other categories of tort:

Negligence is a specific tort and . . . is the failure to exercise that care which the circumstances demand. What amounts to negligence depends on the facts of each particular case. It may consist in omitting to do something which ought to be done or in doing something which ought to be done either in a different manner or not at all. . . . An act of negligence may also constitute a nuisance where it occasions a dangerous state of affairs and satisfies the other requirements of that tort. Equally it may also be a breach of the rule in *Rylands v Fletcher* if it allows the escape of a dangerous thing which the defendant has brought onto his land. Negligent failure to maintain safety standards by an employer may give rise to both liability for negligence and for the tort of breach of statutory duty. Negligent harm to reputation may give rise to both liability for negligence where it occurs within a special relationship causing economic loss, and for defamation. Negligence liability may also overlap with non-tortious grounds of liability under contractual, equitable or public law principles.<sup>4</sup>

Legal negligence measures a person's behaviour against an objective standard. As will be discussed in Section B of this chapter, if a person's

behaviour falls below the objective standard for the person belongs, that person is negligent regardless of the person's state of mind. The court in *Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks Co* (1856) defined legal negligence: "Negligence is the omission to do what a reasonable man . . . would do, or doing something which a reasonable man would not do."<sup>6</sup> Legal negligence is negligence causing injury or damage to another may result in a negligence claim. Only certain types of damage can result in a negligence claim.

In a prior edition, the authors Winfield and Jolowicz defined "Negligence as a tort is a breach of a legal duty to take care in damage to the claimant."<sup>9</sup> Therefore, this tort consists of four elements of negligence in a claim against a tortfeasor (the person referred to as a *respondent* or a *defendant*):

- the defendant owes a duty of care to the injured party, rather than a moral duty;
- the defendant must have breached the duty of care owed to the victim who is bringing the claim to court;
- the victim's injury or damage must be caused by the breach of the duty of care, i.e., causation; and
- the victim must suffer injury or damage.

We will now review each of these elements in turn in the following sections.

### A. Duty of Care

The first element of the tort of negligence is the duty of care. It requires a person to use reasonable care to avoid risks to themselves or their property. There can be no legal claim of negligence unless there is a duty of care owed by a tortfeasor to the injured victim. The duty of care imposes a requirement to meet a standard of conduct. The duty of reasonable care is to prevent injury where one's negligence (to act) creates a foreseeable risk of harm to another.

The development of the common law can be seen in the following cases. Until the principle of duty of care in the tort of negligence was established in *Donoghue v Stevenson* [1932] AC 562, HL established a

determining the exercise of a duty of care. Donoghue, the plaintiff in this case, became ill after drinking a bottle of ginger beer which contained a decomposed snail. Stevenson, the defendant brewery, produced this beer. The issue was whether Stevenson owed a duty of care to the consumer that the brewery sent the ginger beer to a wholesaler, who then sent the ginger beer to a retail store, then ultimately to Donoghue's friend who purchased the ginger beer for Donoghue. The plaintiff could not sue the defendant for breach of contract because there was no contract between Donoghue and Stevenson.

The court, however, decided the case in favour of Donoghue. The court noted that the ginger beer bottle had been sealed at the brewery and was not opened until immediately before drinking. None of the handlers of this product had an opportunity to inspect the bottle's contents as the bottle was opaque. The defendant manufacturer of the ginger beer owed a duty of care to Donoghue, as the ultimate consumer of the ginger beer, to take reasonable care to ensure that the bottle did not contain any substance which was likely to cause injury to health. The court established the neighbour principle where:

The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbour; and the lawyer's question, Who is my neighbour? receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be—persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question.<sup>12</sup>

To summarize the principle set out in *Donoghue*:

A duty of care is owed to those individuals who, one ought reasonably to foresee, might be harmed by one's actions.

The manufacturer of the ginger beer knew that someone would consume the ginger beer. Although the brewery did not know who would consume the beer or when the beer would be consumed, the brewery knew that the ginger beer would be consumed eventually. Thus the brewery owed a duty of care to the ultimate consumer.

Later, the court reformulated the principle of duty of care and suggested the use of a two-stage test in the case of *Anns v London Borough of Merton* [1977] 2 All ER 492, HL by stating that:

the question has to be approached in two stages. First, one asks whether, as between the alleged wrongdoer and the plaintiff or neighbourhood such that, in the reasonable contemplation of the former, carelessness on his part may be likely to cause damage to the latter, in which case a *prima facie* duty of care arises. If the first question is answered affirmatively, it is necessary to consider whether there are any considerations which ought to be taken into account to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class to whom it is owed or the damages to which a breach of it may give rise.<sup>13</sup>

Thus, under the two-stage test, the injured party must show that the damage was foreseeable based on a relationship of sufficient proximity and whether any policy factors might affect a duty of care. Policy factors include morality, sociology, economics, politics, commercial considerations or administrative convenience. Different policy factors are considered according to different types of damage, leading to different results towards the feasibility of allowing a duty of care. The primary concern will be the possibility of opening up a floodgate of claims. A court's decision will result in an indeterminate number of claimants, and, whether there will be liability for an indeterminate amount of damage. A policy factor may be found in the cases discussed below.

Courts should be cautious when applying the *Anns* test. In the later case of *Leigh and Sullivan Ltd v Aliakmon Shipping Co* [1982] 1 QB 350, CA, the judge stated that the courts were not to apply their own conception of policy, as it was not correct:

to regard *Anns*' case . . . as establishing some new and novel test of the duty of care the logical application of which would enable the court in every case to say whether or not a duty of care exists. Nor . . . can it properly be treated either as establishing a new approach to what the policy of the law should be or as giving upon the court a free hand to determine for itself what limits are to be set.<sup>15</sup>

A few years later, the Privy Council decided the case of *Yeu v Attorney-General of Hong Kong* [1988] AC 175. This was a lawsuit by the plaintiffs against the Commissioner of the Companies for placing a deposit-taking company on the register under the *Deposit-taking Companies Ordinance* (Cap 328).

placed money with a deposit-taking company on the government's register. The company went bankrupt and the plaintiffs lost their money. The plaintiffs sought to bring a negligence action against the Commissioner.

The foremost question . . . is whether in the present case the commissioner owed to members of the public who might be minded to deposit their money with deposit-taking companies in Hong Kong a duty, in the discharge of his supervisory powers under the Ordinance, to exercise reasonable care to see that such members of the public did not suffer loss through the affairs of such companies being carried on by their managers in fraudulent or improvident fashion.<sup>16</sup>

Thus, the issue here was the scope of the duty of care owed by the commissioner. The Privy Council determined, in part, that "the two-stage test formulated . . . [in *Anns*] for determining the existence of a duty of care in negligence has been elevated to a degree of importance greater than its merits, and greater perhaps than its author intended".<sup>17</sup> The judicial body continued by stating:

In view of the direction in which the law has since been developing . . . that for the future it should be recognized that the two-stage test in [*Anns*] is not to be regarded as . . . a suitable guide to the existence of a duty of care.<sup>18</sup>

The Privy Council concluded:

there was clearly no voluntary assumption by the commissioner of any responsibility towards the plaintiffs . . . It was argued, however, that the effect of the Ordinance was to place such a responsibility upon him. Their Lordships consider that the Ordinance placed a duty on the commissioner to supervise deposit-taking companies in the general public interest, but no special responsibility towards individual members of the public . . . While the investing public might reasonably feel some confidence that the provisions of the Ordinance as a whole went a long way to protect their interests, reliance on the fact of registration as a guarantee of the soundness of a particular company would be neither reasonable or justifiable, nor should the commissioner reasonably be expected to know of such reliance . . . Accordingly their Lordships are unable to accept the plaintiffs' arguments about reliance as apt, in all the circumstances, to establish a special relationship between them and the commissioner such as to give rise to a duty of care.<sup>19</sup>

The case of *Junior Books v Veitchi* [1982] 3 All ER 572, where recovery to instances of very close proximity where the loss has been expanded to include pure economic loss, as opposed to negligent statements.<sup>89</sup> The rule against recovery for pure economic loss where it can be said that the defendant has assumed a responsibility to the plaintiff and of a duty would be fair.<sup>91</sup>

## 4

## Defences to the Tort of Negligence

All that tort law may involve both a civil case and a criminal case result from the same act. In a civil case, the burden of proving liability is lighter than in a criminal case. The injured party in a civil case must prove all the elements of the tort of negligence on the *balance of probabilities* standard; otherwise, the injured victim has failed to prove its case and the defendant is free of liability. A tortfeasor may raise a defence which would exonerate the tortfeasor from full or partial liability for the injury caused to the victim. Defences available to a tortfeasor against a claim of negligence include contributory negligence and *volenti non fit injuria*.

### Contributory Negligence

In common law, the defence of contributory negligence could completely bar an injured victim's court action, provided that the victim was negligent in avoiding risks, and if this unreasonableness was a substantial factor in producing the injury. This would be the result even if the defendant was also negligent.<sup>1</sup> In other words, if some contributory negligence could be shown on the injured victim's part, the victim would not be able to claim any damages in a negligence action.<sup>2</sup> In Hong Kong, the potentially harsh application of this common law rule has been made less severe by the *Law Amendment and Reform (Consolidation) Ordinance* (Cap 23) which provides for an apportionment of damages. This is because the negligence of both parties is taken into consideration, i.e., the injured party's negligence is compared with that of the tortfeasor.<sup>3</sup> (In some countries, this comparison of the parties' negligence and resulting apportionment of damages is known as *comparative negligence*.) Section 21(1) of the Ordinance states:

Where any person suffers damage as the result partly of his own fault and partly of the fault of any other person or persons, any damages recoverable . . . shall be reduced to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant's responsibility for the damage.<sup>4</sup>

The Law Amendment and Reform (Consolidation) Ordinance (Cap. 1) changes the consequences of negligence.<sup>5</sup> The question of whether there has been contributory negligence is still determined by the common law. In *Nance v British Columbia Electric Railway Co Ltd*,<sup>6</sup> the court said that:

when contributory negligence is set up as a defence, the plaintiff does not depend on any duty owed by the injured party. It is not necessary to prove that the injured party did not in his own interest take reasonable care to avoid the injury he contributed . . . to his own injury.<sup>6</sup>

Should an injured party's conduct fall below the standard of care and thus contribute to the injuries, an apportionment of damages will be made. As mentioned earlier, Section 21(1) of the Law Amendment and Reform (Consolidation) Ordinance provides that damages may be reduced as a court thinks is fair and equitable having regard to the claimant's share in the responsibility for the damage. One factor which the court includes that this determination has two factors: causation and contributory negligence. The court compares the injured party's conduct with the standard of care, measuring their respective blame, and the extent to which the injured party's conduct caused the damage.<sup>7</sup>

### B. *Volenti Non Fit Injuria* (Assumption of Risk)

*Volenti non fit injuria* is translated to mean no injury is done to a person who consents to the risk of injury.<sup>8</sup> *Volenti* is a complete defence to the injured party's lawsuit.<sup>9</sup> If a victim knowingly and voluntarily assumes the risk of injury by the defendant's negligence, the injured party is barred from any loss, damage or injury.<sup>10</sup> Courts generally apply this defence narrowly as courts are reluctant on policy grounds to bar compensation.<sup>11</sup>

The tortfeasor must prove that the injured party assumed the risk of injury to the risk of injury. In other words, the injured party must prove that he assumed the risk, along with the nature of the risk, as

the court will need to determine the injured party's subjective state of mind, as opposed to the objective, reasonable standard required in (contributory) negligence.<sup>12</sup> In *Bowater v Rowley Regis Corporation* [1944] KB 476, the court stated that:

a man cannot be said to be truly "willing" unless he is in a position to choose freely, and freedom of choice predicates, not only full knowledge of the circumstances on which the exercise of choice is conditioned, so that he may be able to choose wisely, but the absence from his mind of any feeling of constraint so that nothing shall interfere with the freedom of his will.<sup>13</sup>

In *Dann v Hamilton* [1939] 1 KB 509, the court decided that mere knowledge of the danger is not sufficient to establish the defence of *volenti non fit injuria*. The defendant in the court case must prove that the injured party agreed to the risk, not simply that the victim had knowledge of the risk.<sup>14</sup> The authoritative source has explained the difference between the defence of assumption of risk and contributory negligence:

it is a good defence that the plaintiff consented to that breach of duty, or, knowing of it, voluntarily incurred the whole risk entailed by it. In such a case the maxim *volenti non fit injuria* applies. This defence is to be distinguished from the plea of contributory negligence, for a plaintiff may have voluntarily exposed himself to the risk of being injured while himself exercising the utmost care for his own safety; and, conversely, while knowledge of the risk may show contributory negligence, it does not prove voluntary assumption of risk.<sup>15</sup>

The Control of Exemption Clauses Ordinance (Cap 71) is a legislative attempt to restrict the use of exemption clauses by commercial enterprises in order to avoid business liability.<sup>16</sup> Section 7(3) of this Ordinance specifies that a person's agreement to or awareness of a contract limiting liability for negligence does not necessarily indicate the person's acceptance of a risk.<sup>17</sup> Section 7(1)<sup>18</sup> of this Ordinance provides that liability for death or personal injury resulting from negligence is not excludable. In respect of other property loss or property damage, Section 7(2)<sup>19</sup> requires that the terms in the exemption clause limiting liability must meet the reasonableness requirement in Section 3.<sup>20</sup> Section 5 of the Ordinance sets out the varieties of exemption clauses.<sup>21</sup> (This Ordinance will be discussed again in Chapter 5 Section D.)

## Other Tortious Liabilities

There are various other forms of tortious liability not based upon the neighbour principle laid down in *Donoghue v Stevenson*. These include:

- ) vicarious liability
- ) breach of statutory duty
- ) employer's liability to workers
- ) occupier's liability
- ) nuisance
- ) trespass
- ) defamation

We will now discuss each of these in turn.

### **Vicarious Liability**

Vicarious liability is legal responsibility imposed on a person for the torts of others, regardless of any fault on the part of the non-tortfeasor.<sup>1</sup> Vicarious liability generally arises from an employer and employee relationship and is conceptually similar to strict liability in tort. Under vicarious liability, an employer's liability does not depend upon the employee's personal fault. Rather, an employer is strictly liable for an employee's negligent acts performed in the course of employment.<sup>2</sup> Here, vicarious liability is not based upon a duty of care personally owed by an employer to an injured plaintiff. Instead, liability is based upon the employment relationship between the defendant (the employer) and the tortfeasor (the employee).<sup>3</sup>

Thus, an employer's liability is completely dependent upon the employee's liability. For an employer to be vicariously liable, the primary

tortfeasor (the employee) must be shown to be at fault. If the tortfeasor is liable, then the employer cannot be vicariously liable. However, if the employer vicariously liable does not remove an employee from the employer and the employee may be liable as joint tortfeasor, the liability of tortfeasors will be discussed in Chapter 6 Section 6.1.

- The requirements for vicarious liability are:
- the tortfeasor is hired by the employer as an employee;
  - the employee committed the tortious act; and
  - the employee's tortious act was in connection with the employment.

This act may be either expressly or impliedly authorized, careless or mistaken. Unless outside the scope of employment, an employer's instructions, will cause the employer to be liable if the tortious act is incidental or necessary to employment.

The prohibition of an act does not necessarily limit the scope of employment. An employer cannot avoid liability by forbidding any negligent acts or any acts outside of employment. A prohibition is only effective if it limits the scope of employment. It depends on whether the prohibited act limits the sphere of employment (an act which is outside the scope of employment) or is within the sphere of employment (an act which is within employment). In other words, if the employee breaches the employer's instructions, the employee will be considered to be outside employment if the instructions set out the limits of the employee's conduct is merely an unauthorized manner. If the act is an authorized act which is sufficiently connected with the employment, the employer will be vicarious liability.<sup>7</sup>

Whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor will determine its employer's obligations and responsibilities. The classification of a worker as an employee or as an independent contractor is therefore a difficult task. This distinction is, at times, a difficult one to make between the parties involved.<sup>8</sup>

An example is the case of *Chan Sik Pan v Wylam's Services Ltd* [1991] HKLRD 687. The court stated that this case "would be a personal injury claim but for issues relating to employment at the time of the accident".<sup>9</sup> The judge continued:

Windsor House in Causeway Bay, was being re-fitted . . . The general contractor had a main sub-contractor for electrical and mechanical work. This main sub-contractor further sub-contracted the fire installation work to the first defendant. According to the first defendant, it appointed one Joe Wong trading in the name of United Company as its agent for such work. Joe Wong on behalf of the first defendant "sub-delegated" part of the work to the second defendant. The second defendant says that he sub-sub-contracted work to the third defendant and so he (the second defendant) had no relationship with the workers like the plaintiff. The third defendant says he was at the material time not a sub-sub-contractor. He (the third defendant) merely supervised the workers like the plaintiff and the work at site.

The plaintiff . . . had no idea as to all the contractual relationships between the defendants and other superior contractors. According to him, an old friend telephoned him about work available at the site. He went and reported to the third defendant. He regarded the third defendant as the foreman. It was the third defendant who handed him wages in cash twice a month on pay day. The plaintiff had no dealing or knowledge of the other defendants until after the accident. It is undisputed fact that after the accident the first defendant filed a statutory industrial accident report (Form II) with the Labour Department. This Form II is the form that an employer must file on every industrial accident that has occurred to a worker under his employ. After filing the report, months later, the first defendant twice reached a written agreement with the plaintiff on the amount of allowance payable under the Employees' Compensation Ordinance (Cap 282). And the allowance was paid to the plaintiff as agreed.

...  
To complicate matters further, neither the second defendant nor the third defendant is covered by any employee compensation insurance. Only the first defendant took out compulsory employee compensation insurance; but because there is evidence that the first defendant sub-contracted work to other parties, the insurers of the first defendant deny that the plaintiff is covered by the insurance of the first defendant.<sup>10</sup>

The following sections review the differences between the two classifications of workers and the guidelines for determining the status of a worker.<sup>11</sup> Then follows a brief review of the requirement that the act be in the course of employment. To conclude this topic of vicarious liability, a short section on an employer's liability for independent contractors.

### i. Employee or Independent Contractor

Traditionally, an employer and an employee were considered to be in a master-servant relationship. Today, this affiliation is considered to be an employer-employee relationship. This relationship, where the employee provides services or labour in return for remuneration by the employer, is created by a contract of service. The employee works for themselves exclusively to their employer's business for employment.<sup>12</sup>

An independent contractor is employed under a contract. An independent contractor provides a particular service from outside the employer's organization to produce a product for which the independent contractor is generally paid. There is no general obligation to serve the employer. The contractor's performance of the assigned task need not be under the employer's supervision.

### ii. Criteria for Determining Status

There are several indicators used to distinguish between an employee and an independent contractor. Despite these indicators, the parties' relationship is not always simple. Several cases illustrate the difficulty in classifying a worker as an employee or independent contractor.

The first of these cases is *Mersey Docks & Harbour Board v Griffith* [1947] AC 1. The court used the control test to determine the parties' employment relationship. Under this test, an employment relationship exists if an employer exercises control over what the worker does and how that work is to be done. Where the nature of the work is too technical or skilful for an employer to exercise control, the control test determines whether the employer has the right to control. An independent contractor relationship exists where an employer assigns a task to a person but has no right to determine how the work is performed.

In *Stevenson, Jordan & Harrison Ltd v MacDonell* [1952] 1 TLR 101, the court used the integration test, also known as the control test, to determine the employment relationship. A person is considered to be an employee if that person is an integral part of the employer's organization rather than an accessory to the business.<sup>13</sup> Under a contract of service, a person is employed as part of the business organization. Under a contract for services, the worker is not integrated into the business but is only supplementary or ancillary to the business.

In the third case, *Wong Po-sin v New Universal Paper Co Ltd* [1973] HKLR 59, the court listed some factors to be considered in determining the existence of an employment relationship:

**Selection:** if an employer has the power to select the individual to work for the employer, whether the selection is made personally by the employer or through the employer's agent, the relationship is likely to be that of an employer-employee.

**Power of dismissal:** if an employer has the power to dismiss a person, this power is more likely to indicate an employer-employee relationship.

**Remuneration:** if a worker is paid periodic wages or a salary which is calculated by reference to piece work or time worked, the relationship is likely to be that of an employer-employee. If a worker is paid a commission or a lump sum, the worker is more likely to be considered to be an independent contractor.

**Performance:** if at least part of the work is performed by the employee alone or independently, i.e., if a worker could delegate the entire performance of work to another person, this would indicate the existence of a contract for services.

**Exclusive services:** an employer has the right to demand the exclusive services of its employees. While an individual is at work, if there is only one employer, that person is likely to be an employee. If an individual simultaneously works for several employers, that person is likely to be an independent contractor.

**Place of work:** if the worker's services are to be performed at the employer's premises rather than at the worker's premises, the worker is more likely to be an employee.

If the worker's services cannot be considered to be provided as part of an independent business carried out by the worker, this suggests an employer-employee relationship rather than an independent contractor relationship.

**Supply of equipment:** the obligation to provide tools or equipment for a worker indicates an employer-employee relationship.

**Hours of work:** if the employer determines working hours, the worker is likely to be an employee. If the worker determines the working hours, the worker is likely to be an independent contractor.

**Type of work:** where the worker is engaged generally without reference to any particular task or outcome, the relationship is more likely to be that of an employer-employee.<sup>14</sup>