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The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement

The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement

Author: Daniel Crane
Publisher: Oxford University Press USA
ISBN: 9780195372656
Published In: March 2011
Format: Hardback , 268 pages
Jurisdiction: U.S. ? Disclaimer:
Countri(es) stated herein are used as reference only

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Focuses on whether, and to what extent, antitrust enforcement should be administered primarily by problem-solving experts rather than generalist judges or juries
Considers debates about how intrusive antitrust authorities should be in regulating market economies
Provides a rigorous explanation and critique of antitrust's enforcement mechanisms to illuminate contemporary debates over contested topics
Provides historical context for current debates about antitrust institutions
Introduces antitrust institutions in the U.S., the European Union, and other jurisdictions

The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement, by Daniel A. Crane provides a comprehensive and succinct treatment of the history, structure, and behavior of the various U.S. institutions that enforce antitrust laws, such as the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. It addresses the relationship between corporate regulation and antitrust, the uniquely American approach of having two federal antitrust agencies, antitrust federalism, and the predominance of private enforcement over public enforcement. It also draws comparisons with the structure of institutional enforcement outside the United States in the European Union and in other parts of the world, and it considers the possibility of creating international antitrust institutions through the World Trade Organization or other treaty mechanisms. The book derives its topics from historical, economic, political, and theoretical perspectives.

Readership: Antitrust Officials, Law Professors, Economists

Acknowledgments
Introduction
Part I - Origins and Development of U.S. Antitrust Institutions
Chapter One: Antifederalism and Corporate Regulation
Chapter Two: The Curious Case of Dual Federal Enforcement
Chapter Three: Private Enforcement: Growth and Backlash
Chapter Four: Shifting Towards Technocracy
Part II - Optimizing Institutional Performance
Chapter Five: Adjudication, Regulation, and Administration
Chapter Six. The Much-Maligned Antitrust Jury
Chapter Seven: Improving Public Enforcement
Chapter Eight: State Enforcement and Federal Preemption
Chapter Nine: Rethinking Private Enforcement
Part III - Comparative and International Perspectives
Chapter Ten: How and Why is Europe Different?
Chapter Eleven: Emerging Antitrust Institutions Around the World
Chapter Twelve: Toward International Antitrust Institutions?
Index

Daniel A. Crane, Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School

Daniel A. Crane is a law professor at the University of Michigan, where he teaches contracts, antitrust, and antitrust and intellectual property. His scholarship has focused primarily on antitrust and economic regulation, particularly the institutional structure of antitrust enforcement, predatory pricing, bundling, and the antitrust implications of various patent practices. His work has appeared in the University of Chicago Law Review, the Texas Law Review, California Law Review, the Michigan Law Review, the Cornell Law Review, and the Minnesota Law Review, among other journals. He is the co-editor (with Eleanor Fox) of the Antitrust Stories volume of Foundation Press's Law Stories series.