The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement

• Focuses on whether, and to what extent, antitrust enforcement should be administered primarily by problem-solving experts rather than generalist judges or juries
• Considers debates about how intrusive antitrust authorities should be in regulating market economies
• Provides a rigorous explanation and critique of antitrust's enforcement mechanisms to illuminate contemporary debates over contested topics
• Provides historical context for current debates about antitrust institutions
• Introduces antitrust institutions in the U.S., the European Union, and other jurisdictions

The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement, by Daniel A. Crane provides a comprehensive and succinct treatment of the history, structure, and behavior of the various U.S. institutions that enforce antitrust laws, such as the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. It addresses the relationship between corporate regulation and antitrust, the uniquely American approach of having two federal antitrust agencies, antitrust federalism, and the predominance of private enforcement over public enforcement. It also draws comparisons with the structure of institutional enforcement outside the United States in the European Union and in other parts of the world, and it considers the possibility of creating international antitrust institutions through the World Trade Organization or other treaty mechanisms. The book derives its topics from historical, economic, political, and theoretical perspectives.

Readership: Antitrust Officials, Law Professors, Economists