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The Limits and Logic of Agency Theory in Company Law

The Limits and Logic of Agency Theory in Company Law

Author: Jonathan Hardman
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 9781032275406
Published In: September 2024
Format: Hardback
Jurisdiction: U.K. ? Disclaimer:
Countri(es) stated herein are used as reference only

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Description
Contents

Details

Agency theory is ubiquitous in company law. This book explores (a) the limits of such deployment, and (b) the logic of how to deploy it.

The book makes five linked arguments in respect of the limits of agency theory in company law. First, it argues that agency theory has become so broad that it can be used to analyse most human relationships. Such breadth, though, comes at the expense of legal clarity: as agency relationships cover such a broad range of relationships, there are no normative legal conclusions that can be drawn merely from identifying such a relationship. Second, it argues that we need to differentiate more specific concepts with clearer legal implications, such as externalities, and the particular manifestation of moral hazard that appears in insurance dynamics. Third, it argues that considerable amounts of existing company law theory which is ostensibly built from agency theory, is in fact based on a series of hidden value judgments at each stage of the analysis. Fourth, it argues that company law theory should use agency theory less to rebalance the discipline: agency theory has become hegemonic which is dangerous for the discipline, obscures company law’s role in establishing incentives, undermines accountability, and reduces company law’s autonomy.

The book then moves to the logic of agency theory and makes three arguments. First, it argues that we need to factor in the company, only apply agency theory to voluntary interactions, and foreground our value judgments when identifying agency relations to do it properly. Second, it argues that it is rational to incur agency costs where we perceive the benefit of doing so outweighs such costs, meaning that agency costs are facilitative and we should look to front-end them rather than universally minimise them. Third, it argues that this needs to be undertaken through mandatory laws.

Exploring the external limits and internal logic of agency cost analysis, this book will be of interest to academics, students and researchers of corporate and company law.

1. Introduction

Part I: The Limits of Agency Theory in Company Law

2. The Ubiquity of Agency Costs

3. Delineating Agency Costs

4. The Evitable Dominance of Agency Cost Analysis in Company Law

5. A Need for Rebalance

Part II: The Logic of Agency Theory in Company Law

6. Corporate Agency Costs

7. Incurring Agency Costs

8. Resolving (Front-Ending) Agency Costs

9. Conclusion