The Logic of Precedent: Constraint, Freedom, and Common Law Reasoning

Unlike statutory law, which relies on the explicit formulation of rules, common law is thought to emerge from a complex doctrine of precedential constraint, according to which decisions in earlier cases constrain later courts while still allowing these courts the freedom to address new situations in creative ways. Although this doctrine is applied by legal practitioners on a daily basis, it has proved to be considerably more difficult to develop an adequate theoretical account of the doctrine itself.

Drawing on recent work in legal theory, as well as AI and law, this book develops a new account of precedential constraint and the balance achieved in the common law between constraint and freedom. This account, which involves construction of a group priority ordering among reasons, is then applied to other topics including the semantics of open-textured predicates and the practice of making exceptions to general rules.

• Relates recent work in field of AI and law to traditional issues from legal theory
• Provides a new, formally precise yet accessible, account of the nature of common law constraint
• Examines the nature of legal reasoning and the complex and shifting relation between the elements of precedent, constraint, and rule-following which are constantly in play

About the author: John Horty is a Distinguished University Professor of philosophy at the University of Maryland, USA, with an affiliate appointment in the UM Institute for Advanced Computer Studies. His research spans several areas, including logic, artificial intelligence, ethics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of law. Horty’s work aims to integrate these disciplines to address complex questions about human cognition, language and legal systems.