Details
- A unique and challenging analysis of the BSE crisis, science and policy making - what happened, what went wrong, and why
- Shows how policy makers were not well-informed of the risks that BSE posed - failure of BSE policy was not accidental - how can policy making be understood and what lessons can be learned?
- Gives expert insight into the conclusions of the Phillips enquiry as well as extending and supplementing the analysis
- Evaluates emerging public health policy changes in the light of the BSE crisis
- Provides comparisons with policy making at the European Commission and other European countries
- A key text for debates about the future of public policy-making about technological risks
This book provides a lucid and compelling analysis of the BSE crisis and how policy-making processes were managed, and of how and why they culminated in catastrophic failure. It is the first comprehensive scholarly analysis of the relationship between science and politics in BSE policy-making. The book re-assesses the conclusions of the Phillips enquiry into the UK government's handling of the BSE epidemic as well as extending and supplementing the analysis. The book evaluates emerging public health policy changes in the light of the experience with the BSE crisis.
The ways in which risks, from challenges such as BSE, GM crops, mobile phone masts and global warming, used to be assessed and managed are no longer adequate or acceptable. Traditional arrangements are no longer seen as having either scientific or democratic legitimacy. Governments, scientific advisors, and many stakeholder groups recognise that a new approach to risk policy-making is needed. New structures and processes should be able to provide greater scientific and democratic legitimacy. While BSE policy-making in the UK is a central focus of BSE: risk, science and governance comparisons with policy-making at the European Commission and other European countries are also provided. The authors develop an analysis of how and why BSE policy-making failed and then derive a general set of lessons about how science-based risk policy-making should be understood and re-organised. Those lessons are applicable across the entire field of risk policy-making and can apply in all jurisdictions.
The book is directed at those involved in science policy, risk and public health as well as public officials, scientists and policy makers responsible for dealing with issues of risk, public health and policy making. The book will provide a unique analysis based on very real issues of interest across Europe. The authors are well-respected researchers who have published widely on this subject and have recently completed a multi-country study of how BSE has been handled.
Readership: Those involved in science policy, risk and public health as well as public officials, scientists and policy-makers responsible for dealing with issues of risk and public health and policy making
1: Introduction
2: Analysing the role of science in public policy-making
3: The evolution of UK's agriculture and food policy regimes
4: A new cattle disease
5: The Southwood Working Party
6: Regulatory rigor mortis
7: BSE policy in Continental Europe
8: The aftermath of 20 March 1996
9: BSE and the partial reform of food policy making
10: Summary and conclusions
Bibliography
Index
Patrick van Zwanenberg, Research Fellow, Science and Technology Policy Research, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK, and Erik Millstone, Reader in Science Policy, Science and technology Policy Research, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK
"A scholarly analysis of the relationship between science and politics, in policy-making related to BSE." - CAB Abstracts
"In BSE: Risk, Science, and Governance, Patric van Zwanenberg and Erik Millstone analyse this policy disaster. They focus on the relationship in the UK between scientists and government, using the superb collection of information gathered by the Phillips Inquiry into BSE as its main source. van Zwanenberg and Milestone tell a sorry story well. They end with sound prescriptions for reforming the relation between science and policy." - Hugh Penningtom
