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- Proposes a new conceptual and legal framework for ensuring the global security of nuclear weapons and fissile material
- Provides an analysis of the reasons for the breakdown of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and includes the author's prescriptive elaboration of a new foundation for counterproliferation of nuclear weapons
- Includes an analysis of how to achieve counterproliferation empowerment of nuclear forensics, through international intelligence, export-import controls, multi-internationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle, and interdiction of transport
- Shows how the proposed new foundation for nuclear weapons counterproliferation would serve to reduce nuclear weapons risk in relation to the principal nuclear weapons hotspots that today threaten global security, including most particularly Iran/Israel, the North Korean nuclear threat, Pakistan's nuclear security and its nuclear confrontation with India
- Analysis of how the proposed new foundation for nuclear weapons counterproliferation would serve to reduce nuclear weapons risk in relation to the principal nuclear weapons hotspots that today threaten global security, including most particularly Iran/Israel, the North Korean nuclear threat, Pakistan's nuclear security and its nuclear confrontation with India
Nuclear Weapons Counterproliferation: A New Grand Bargain proposes a new legal and institutional framework for counterproliferation of nuclear weapons. Its proposal is designed to remedy the widely acknowledged breakdown of the architecture of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on which we can no longer rely for global nuclear security.
First, Nuclear Weapons Counterproliferation defines the distinctively dangerous character of contemporary nuclear risk and explains why the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty no longer provides a viable foundation for counterproliferation of nuclear weapons. It then sets out the reforms needed in order to limit the radical increase in availability, for rogue governments and terrorists, of nuclear weapons related material and technology. Garvey then proposes a new counterproliferation architecture, to be built on presently available scientific, legal, and institutional resources, which could achieve a critical reduction of nuclear risk and an expanded deterrence. Guiding principles for establishing this new architecture are formulated, including, most importantly, the principal mechanism for implementation, a proposed United Nations Security Council Counterproliferation Resolution applying equally for all states.
This book presents what may be our best opportunity to secure a profoundly more effective global nuclear security and counter the world's current course to a catastrophic nuclear detonation.
Readership: Scholars and students of international law, political science, foreign relations, and strategic studies. Governmental and non-governmental organizations, and foundations concerned with nuclear weapons and related issues.
I. Introduction
A. The Need for a New Counterproliferation Foundation
B. The Old Grand Bargain Breakdown
i. The Goal of Nuclear Disarmament
ii. The Flawed Nexus of Nuclear Disarmament and
Nuclear Counterproliferation
C. Legitimacy; The Challenge of Asymmetric Possession of Nuclear Weapons
II. Futility of Nuclear Risk Management in a Purely Consensual Regime
A. Nuclear Terrorism
B. State-to-State Nuclear Weapons Risk
C. Risk Reduction by Consent
III. Security Council Mandate of Universal Standards
A. 'Global Legislation' by the United Nations Security Council
i. The Security Council as Global Legislator
ii. The Legal Debate
iii. The Legal Debate Enlightened by Political Realism
iv. Counterproliferation as Best Prospect for Security Council Legislation
B. Counterproliferation Beyond Current 'Legislation'
C.Universal Standards
i. Nuclear Security as an Independent International Interest
ii. No Classification of States
iii. International Administration of Universal Standards
IV. Elements of an Effective Counterproliferation Architecture
A. Expanding Deterrence; An International Nuclear Forensics Data Bank
i. Contemporary Nuclear Forensics Capability
ii. Expanded Deterrence
iii. The Legal and Institutional Empowerment of Nuclear Forensics
B. The Internationalization of Counterproliferation Intelligence
i. The Incongruity of National Intelligence Resources and Transnational Nuclear Risk
ii. The Imperative for International Institutionalization of Intelligence
iii. Feasibility
C. Export-Import Control
i. The Club that Cannot Counter-Proliferate
ii. Institutionalization of Export-Import Controls under Security Council Mandate
D. Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
E. Interdiction of Nuclear Weapons Related Transport; The Proliferation Security Initiative
i. Counterproliferation Designed to be Least Legal; 'An Activity, Not an Organization'
ii. Interface of the Proliferation Security Initiative and International Law
a. Coastal State Jurisdiction
b. High Seas Jurisdiction
c. Self-Defense
iii. Institutionalization of the Proliferation Security Initiative under Security Council Mandate; Legitimacy and Effectiveness
V. Compliance
VI. Political Will
VII. Conclusion
Jack Garvey, Professor, University of San Francisco Law School
Jack Garvey is Professor of Law at the University of San Francisco School of Law, where he is also Chairman of the International Programs Department. Professor Garvey holds degrees at the University of Chicago, Harvard College, Oxford University, and Harvard Law School. Professor Garvey served as law clerk for Judge Hubert L. Will of the U.S. Federal District Court in Chicago and also as legislative assistant and speechwriter for Senator George McGovern, with responsibility for foreign policy positioning of the McGovern campaign for the Presidency of the United States. Professor Garvey practiced international law in San Francisco with the firm of Graham and James.
"A new vision for the counterproliferation of nuclear weapons may be our most critical national security need. In lucid prose, Professor Garvey substantiates why counter-proliferation on its present course is failing. He then presents a new approach using an instrument at hand. He explains that the current evolution of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, if seized to realize a new path, may offer the best - and perhaps the only - means to counter the spread of nuclear weapons. His New Grand Bargain should be studied with care." --Harold Palmer Smith Jr., Distinguished Visiting Scholar and Professor at the Goldman School of Public Policy at the University of California at Berkeley (UCB), formerly Assistant to the United States Secretary of Defense, and responsible for implementation of th
